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The Limits of Partisan Prejudice
Yphtach Lelkes, University of Pennsylvania
Sean J. Westwood, Dartmouth College

Partisanship increasingly factors into the behavior of Americans in both political and nonpolitical situations, yet the
bounds of partisan prejudice are largely unknown. In this paper, we systematically evaluate the limits of partisan
prejudice using a series of ﬁve studies situated within a typology of prejudice. We ﬁnd that partisan prejudice predicts
suppression of hostile rhetoric toward one’s own party, avoidance of members of the opposition, and a desire for
preferential treatment for one’s own party. While these behaviors may cause incidental or indirect harm to the opposition, we ﬁnd that even the most affectively polarized—those with the strongest disdain for the opposition—are no
more likely to intentionally harm the opposition than those with minimal levels of affective polarization.

P

artisanship, by most accounts, divides the American
public. Disdain for the political opposition—referred
to as affective polarization (Iyengar, Sood, and Lelkes
2012), social polarization (Mason 2014), or partyism (Brooks
2014; Sunstein 2014)—has signiﬁcantly grown over the past
30 years.1 At the same time, evidence shows that partisan
afﬁliation not only increasingly affects political behavior
(Bafumi and Shapiro 2009) but also appears to change the
behavior of partisans in apolitical environments as diverse
as mate selection (Alford et al. 2011; Huber and Malhotra
2012; Klofstad, McDermott, and Hatemi 2012), home buying (Bishop 2009), and scholarship allocations (Iyengar
and Westwood 2015; Munro, Lasane, and Leary 2010; for
a review, see Brandt et al. [2014]). Recent evidence shows
that partisanship is a strong social identity (Huddy, Mason,
and Aaroe 2015; Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood
2015) that fundamentally drives America’s culture war (Jacoby 2014). These results are compelling, but just how bad
has partisan prejudice become in America? Does partisan
anger and animosity lead Americans to forgo democratic
norms?
Partisanship in the American context is highly conﬂictual and is inherently based on the formation and compe-

tition of parties and party members. The literature suggests
that partisanship is important in many aspects of American life, but the magnitude of the effects of partisan affect
on behavior is unclear. The extensive study of ideological
polarization (Abramowitz and Saunders 1998; Brewer 2005;
Fiorina and Levendusky 2006; Hetherington 2001; Iyengar
et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Jacobson 2003; Levendusky 2009; Wolfe 1998)—and the emerging work on affective polarization (e.g., Carlin and Love 2013; Levendusky
and Malhotra 2013; Mason 2014)—does not explain how
partisan affect changes the behavior of partisans, nor does it
assess just how damaging partisan prejudice is within American society.
We present a rigorous assessment of the limits of partisan prejudice using a framework of prejudice developed
by Gordon Allport (1954) that is widely used in both political science and the social sciences. One need not take
Allport’s framework as the ﬁnal word on prejudice to recognize its utility in demarcating increasing levels of prejudice. Prejudice, as Allport and many others argue (e.g., Green
and Seher 2003), is not a binary construct but a continuum.
And as prejudice increases, its manifestations evolve. The
Allport framework is useful as it deﬁnes differing levels of
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prejudice and formalizes criteria for discrimination.2 We augment this framework by also considering that interparty prejudice may not cause behavior toward the out-group that is
reciprocally related toward behavior toward the in-group. For
instance, prejudiced partisans may be willing to work to help
an in-group member but not be willing to hurt an out-group
member.
We offer ﬁve studies that investigate how partisan affective polarization changes behavior toward co-partisans
and opposing partisans. Our ﬁrst three experiments test the
ﬁrst two levels of Allport’s framework ( promotion of negative rhetoric and avoidance) and show that partisan affect
does relate to prejudicial behavior at these levels in Allport’s framework. Our ﬁrst experiment shows that as partisan polarization increases, participants are more willing to
suppress rhetoric that is hostile toward their own party but
are not more willing to promote rhetoric that criticizes the
out-party. Our second and third experiments show that
higher levels of affective polarization increase the avoidance
of opposition partisans. Affective polarization and the ﬁrst
levels on Allport’s framework of prejudice are related, which
is consistent with existing work on partisan preferences. At
these levels of prejudice, partisans both favor co-partisans
and punish opposing partisans, but many posit that these
low-level forms of prejudice have caused or will cause partisans to actively discriminate against the opposition (see
Bishop 2009; Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood
2015). Our last two experiments consistently show that affectively polarized partisans favor co-partisans even when
such favoritism violates democratic norms. However, these
co-partisan preferences are not mirrored by opposing partisan biases.
We show that, despite growing partisan animosity and
co-partisan favoritism—a clear willingness to denigrate the
opposition and a general preference to avoid the opposition—
those at the highest levels of affective polarization are no
more willing to intentionally harm (discriminate against) the
opposition than those at the lowest levels of affective polarization. Even though citizens appear to endorse the hostility
that dominates modern political campaigns (e.g., Geer 2008),
partisan news (Prior 2007; Sobieraj and Berry 2011), and
governance (Grimmer and King 2011), they endorse discriminatory behavior only by favoring co-partisans. Elites
supporting or engaging in discriminatory behavior against
the political opposition (e.g., politically motivated investi-

2. Allport also includes violence and extermination as the most serious levels of prejudice. However, apart from scattered cases of vandalism
(Associated Press 2004), these levels are not yet concerns in American
politics.

gations, cover-ups, gerrymandering, and campaign ﬁnance
abuse), our results suggest, are out of step with even the most
partisan citizens.
Further, this paper addresses lingering puzzles in our
understanding of partisan bias not engaged in earlier work
(i.e., Carlin and Love 2013; Iyengar and Westwood 2015;
Munro, Lasane, and Leary 2010). First, these studies test for
differences in the behavior of identiﬁers of one party toward identiﬁers of another; they do not determine the degree to which partisan prejudice underpins this behavior.
Second, existing models test partisan prejudice in limited
contexts and largely assume that co-partisan (in-group) favoritism and opposing partisan (out-group) animosity are
zero-sum and reciprocally related. Finally, past research
treats prejudice as a binary outcome—it either exists or it
does not—and does not differentiate between different
manifestations of prejudice. We address all three of these
points directly.
Our work has broad implications for the study of American politics. Our ﬁndings demonstrate the need to revisit
assumptions on the symmetry and nature of the divisions
of Americans along party lines. Partisan hostility among
the electorate runs high, but the actual effects of affective
polarization are not as pernicious as has been suggested in
various academic and nonacademic sources. Partisan prejudice is real, but it is largely limited to partisan bluster,
avoidance, and co-partisan favoritism. As we discuss later,
this has implications for democratic politics and representation.

THE EXTENT OF AFFECTIVE POLARIZATION
IN AMERICA
Ordinary Americans are divided, although not necessarily
due to any sort of ideological or policy-based difference
between parties (Mason 2014). While there is much disagreement over the existence and extent of ideological polarization in the electorate (Abramowitz 2007, 2010; Abramowitz and Saunders 1998, 2005, 2008; Abramowitz and
Stone 2006; Brewer 2005; Fiorina and Abrams 2008; Fiorina, Abrams, and Pope 2005; Fiorina and Levendusky 2006;
Hetherington 2001; Jacobson 2003, 2004, 2005; Jacobson
and Abramowitz 2006; Levendusky 2009; Wolfe 1998),
there is general agreement that partisans of different stripes
do not seem to like each other very much.
Since the 1980s, the percentage of Americans who
strongly dislike the political opposition has risen fairly dramatically. Iyengar et al. (2012) ﬁnd that partisans today
are much more likely to believe that members of the outparty are mean, hypocritical, and selﬁsh. Additionally, the
gap between in-party and out-party warmth registered on
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the American National Election Studies’ feeling thermometer scales has increased by a third over the past 30 years
(Iyengar et al. 2012), and Americans register increasing
anger at the other side’s political candidate (Mason 2013).
Citizens are also more dubious of the motivations and ulterior motives of politicians from the opposing party than
for co-partisans (Munro, Weih, and Tsai 2010). Partisanship is now a strong social identity that signiﬁcantly changes
attitudes and behaviors (see Huddy et al. 2015; Iyengar and
Westwood 2015). This line of work indicates that America
is increasingly divided on affective, albeit not necessarily
ideological, grounds (see also Hetherington and Weiler 2009;
Jacoby 2014; Mason 2013, 2014).
A thorough exposition of the roots of affective polarization is beyond the scope of this paper. But, in brief, some
place the blame on ideological polarization at the elite level
(Haidt and Hetherington 2012; Iyengar et al. 2012; Rogowski and Sutherland 2015) coupled with an inﬂux of negative campaigning (Iyengar et al. 2012) and the growth of
partisan media (Lelkes, Sood, and Iyengar, forthcoming).
According to this view, vitriol among political elites is exacerbating out-party animosity. Fiorina (2013) and Mason (2014)
take the view that affective polarization is due to issue-based
sorting of the electorate. Here we focus on documenting the
effects of partisan animosity.
Regardless of source, partisan animosity is unique
among social divides. Strong social norms constrain overt
bias along racial, ethnic, and gender divides, while there are
no comparable norms to constrict partisan bias. The nature
of politics is also inherently competitive and is based on
conﬂicts between groups for the division of real and consequential goods. Partisan animosity is both inherent in the
structure of democratic systems and encouraged by political ofﬁcials, parties, and candidates. The result is that partisan identity is imbued with a constant sense of threat or
fear of loss to rivals. By fostering group representation and
identity, democratic systems also construct a strong ingroup and out-group divide that, ironically, creates incentives to discriminate based on partisan afﬁliation.

DEFINING THE BOUNDS OF PARTISAN PREJUDICE
As a benchmark to which we can compare partisan prejudice, we start with Allport’s (1954) framework of prejudice, which is utilized to study prejudice in a variety of domains (Dovidio, Glick, and Rudman 2005), including racism
(Feagin 1992), ageism (Fraboni, Saltstone, and Hughes 1990),
and sexism (MacInnis and Hodson 2012). We focus on the
ﬁrst three levels of the framework: the promotion of negative speech, the avoidance of out-group members, and actual discrimination, which comes about only when a group

Number 2

April 2017 / 487

actively and intentionally causes harm to other groups (Allport 1954). Although milder levels of prejudice captured in
the ﬁrst two levels of Allport’s typology are certainly politically important—bashing the opposition and avoiding the
opposition are far from normative models of citizen behavior—discrimination is particularly concerning, as it is
incompatible with doctrines of equal justice and egalitarianism deﬁned in the American ethos (McClosky and Zaller
1984).
There is evidence that we treat co-partisans differently
than we treat out-party members even in nonpolitical domains. For example, previous studies where partisans must
allocate some punishment or reward, that is, make a zerosum decision to either allocate a scholarship between two
people (Iyengar and Westwood 2015) or to admit one of
two students into college (Munro, Lasane, and Leary 2010),
show that partisanship drives prejudicial decision making.
In these studies, one of the hypothetical applicants is typically a Republican, and the other is typically a Democrat.
While these studies clearly show an asymmetry in outcomes, the nature of these interactions pits one group
against another, which makes it impossible to untangle “ingroup love” from “out-group hate.” As Brewer (1999, 431)
notes, “Whenever the structure of resources or opportunities really is a zero-sum situation, any preferential treatment of in-group members will be achieved at the detriment of out-group members, but this does not mean that
attitudes are similarly zero-sum.”
Feelings toward the in-group are not necessarily reciprocally related to feelings toward the out-group (Brewer
1999; Crawford, Modri, and Motyl 2013; Halevy, Weisel,
and Bornstein 2012; Weisel and Böhm 2015). While the
original “minimal-group” experiments (Rabbie and Horwitz
1969; Tajfel et al. 1971) demonstrate that the arbitrary categorization of participants into “in-groups” and “out-groups”
leads to an allocation of resources that beneﬁts the ingroup, later studies demonstrate that the in-group/out-group
effect dissipates when the resource represents a punishment rather than a reward (Otten and Mummendey 2000;
Otten, Mummendey, and Blanz 1996). Although Tajfel et
al.’s (1971) ﬁnding of in-group favoritism has been replicated numerous times when it comes to the distribution
of money or other positive outcomes in the minimal group
paradigm, extensions to the original design used by Tajfel
show that out-groups are not punished more than in-groups
when it comes to the distribution of unpleasant tasks or unpleasant experiences (Mummendey et al. 1992; Otten et al.
1996). Despite this work in psychology, the majority of the
political science literature suggests, although does not formally test, that partisanship is a special case where punitive
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behavior is especially prevalent and acceptable (e.g., see
Bishop 2009; Iyengar et al. 2012; Iyengar and Westwood
2015).
We augment Allport’s framework to distinguish between
in-group favoritism and out-group hostility within each
domain. If partisan prejudice predicts quashing negative
speech directed toward one’s own party, it is indicative of
in-group favoritism within the domain of negative speech.
If partisan prejudice is associated with promoting negative
speech, we see it as indicative of out-group hostility. Furthermore, quashing of offensive speech directed toward
one’s own group is a more benign manifestation of prejudice in this domain than promoting negative speech against
the opposition. Similarly, if partisan prejudice predicts a
preference for the company of co-partisans, it is a less severe manifestation in the second domain of Allport’s framework than is the active avoidance of out-partisans.
In the next section, we systemically evaluate the nature
of partisan prejudice through a series of experiments designed to test the relationship between affective polarization
and each level of prejudicial behavior. Throughout these
experiments, we disentangle the effects of in-group and outgroup favoritism. In supplemental analyses, we also examine
whether Republicans and Democrats differ substantively in
their reactions, as we might expect those on the right to be
more punitive than those on the left (e.g., Hibbing, Smith,
and Alford 2014; Zavala et al. 2010).

LEVEL 1 (ANTILOCUTION): AFFECTIVE
POLARIZATION AND THE PROMOTION
OF HOSTILE RHETORIC
The lowest level of prejudice in the Allport framework is a
willingness to speak badly of, or at least promote negative
speech toward, an out-group. Anecdotal evidence and prior
research show that partisan interactions are often rancorous (e.g., Sobieraj and Berry 2011). This open willingness to
derogate partisan opponents is very close to the traditional
conceptualization of prejudice as “free-ranging, hostile feelings or unmitigated, derogatory stereotypes” (Jackman
2005, 96), but when citizens debate politics—especially
online—they do so in spaces that are often dominated by
highly motivated citizens and political elites. For example,
the comments sections on FoxNews.com or HufﬁngtonPost
.com may not be representative of what political activity or
hostility looks like for average Americans. The exponential
increase in name-calling, character assassinations, mockery,
and other forms of “political outrage” shown in prior work
(see Sobieraj and Berry 2011) are dramatic, but are less
politically interested Americans willing to engage in these
kinds of prejudicial behaviors? Furthermore, is political

prejudice more associated with acts of hostility (speaking
badly of their opponents) or with in-group solidarity (making sure no one else speaks badly of the group)?
We use an experiment to assess the degree to which
affective polarization moderates the willingness to spread
vitriolic political speech (operationalized as news content).
This allows us to document the behavior for a representative group of citizens and to show the inﬂuence of partisan
hatred on this behavior. Participants (N p 556) from a
sample drawn from a Survey Sampling International (SSI)
panel completed our experiment under the guise of helping
a news organization decide what information it should
feature on its website. Participants were therefore given the
opportunity to promote or suppress negative news content
in a realistic setting.
The study’s participants were told that an opinion piece
had been submitted by a reader and that the news website
needed input on the quality of the article.3 In this sense, the
design replicates the content aggregation and assessment
processes present in many online news outlets. Participants
were not told that the research project was created by political scientists or that the content they would evaluate would
be political.
Under this pretense, participants were randomly assigned to read one of two news opinion articles: a column
from Fox News blaming congressional gridlock on Democrats or an MSNBC column blaming Republicans for the
gridlock. The two stories were identical, with only the source
and the name of the party altered. The text of the manipulations appear in table 1. The text goes beyond mere criticism and includes name-calling and hyperbole. After reading
the article, participants were asked if they would endorse the
article for inclusion on the news organization’s website. This
design made it possible to measure the extent to which partisans are likely to share and endorse news content that criticizes the opposition and the extent to which partisans are
likely to recommend against sharing news content that criticizes their own party.
Our measure of affective polarization here—and throughout this manuscript—is the difference in the feeling thermometer score for a respondent’s own party and the feeling
thermometer score for the opposition party.4 This value
3. We use an opinion story because it serves as a conservative test of
how willing partisans are to denigrate the opposition. Profane language
and ad homonym attacks evoke a stronger affective response in pretests,
but these kinds of messages are taken less seriously by respondents.
4. Following past work, we include respondents who rated their inparty lower than the out-party. Neither omitting these respondents from
the analysis nor recoding their score to the neutral point substantively
change the results in any of our analyses.
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Table 1. Study 1 Partisan Stimuli
Source: [MSNBC/FoxNews]
Headline: [Republicans/Democrats] Drive Congress to Do Less
Than Last Year's Record-Breaking Low
Full text: Led by the [Republican/Democrat]'s refusal to compromise, the current U.S. Congress faces a backlog of unﬁnished business and sliding approval ratings. It is on pace to vote
on fewer bills than its predecessor—which had the least number of measures signed into the law since modern record
keeping began in the 1940s.
The [right/left] has gone too far by hijacking our government and
ideals. [Republicans/Democrats] must recognize that the
country is not behind their obstructionist tactics. We need to
move forward without letting crazy members of the opposition
hold our nation hostage.
Out of touch [Republicans/Democrats] are causing the gridlock by
being unwilling and unable to engage in the normal process
of negotiation and compromise.
Major pieces of legislation, including a budget agreement and a
farm and food-aid policy bill, are sitting on the sidelines.

was then rescaled to range between 0 and 1. While prejudice has both cognitive and affective components, the affective component is most strongly associated with attitudes and behavior toward outside groups (e.g., Stangor,
Sullivan, and Ford 1991). This measure is the most used
measure of affective polarization (Haidt and Hetherington
2012; Hetherington and Weiler 2009; Iyengar and Westwood
2015; Mason 2014) and consistently yields results similar to
other operationalizations (e.g., social distance measures). Relying on difference scores, rather than raw feeling thermometer
scores, helps ameliorate the differential item functioning of
feeling thermometers (Wilcox, Sigelman, and Cook 1989).
In this experiment, we ﬁnd clear evidence of prejudice in
how citizens evaluate critical news content.5 People generally supported sharing content that is critical of the opposition and did not support sharing content that criticizes
their own party. Participants who read the article that criticized the opposing party recommended inclusion 64.74%
of the time, while only 25.41% of participants recommended sharing the article criticizing their own party. At

5. As a manipulation check, we asked these participants to rate the
tone of the article they read on a three-point scale (positive, neutral,
negative). Both Democrats and Republicans rated the article attacking
their party as much more negative than the article attacking the opposing
party (a difference of 20% for Democrats and 30% for Republicans).
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ﬁrst glance, out-group hate handily overwhelms in-group
love, but it is unclear how much inﬂuence partisan animosity actually had on these recommendations.6
To assess whether affective polarization affects the probability that a partisan recommends an article, we regressed,
using a binary logit model, a person’s decision on his or her
affective polarization score.7 Figure 1 shows the effect of
affective polarization on the probability of recommending
each of the two articles. Higher levels of affective polarization are strongly related to quashing an article hostile to
the in-party (b p 23.51, 95% conﬁdence interval [25.00,
22.02]), but not to promoting an article hostile to the outparty (b p 1.31, 95% conﬁdence interval [2.39, 3.01]).
The difference in how minimally and maximally polarized participants assess content critical of their party is massive (ﬁg. 1, left panel). The probability of a minimally polarized participant recommending content critical of his or
her party is .87, while the probability of a maximally polarized participant recommending the article is only .15.
Although the relationship is not as stark, and the conﬁdence
interval around the estimate overlaps with zero, more affectively polarized participants are also more likely to promote speech critical of the other side. The likelihood of the
most polarized participant recommending such an article
is .85, while the likelihood of the least polarized participant
recommending the article is .54. Hence, the effect of affective
polarization on recommending was twice as large when the
article bashed the in-party as when it attacked the out-party.
Those who are affectively polarized respond to negative
partisan rhetoric even when evaluating a fairly benign opinion
piece. Partisan affective polarization is clearly associated with
the promotion of negative speech against one’s opponents. For
the politically prejudiced, protecting the in-group from negative rhetoric is more important than attacking the out-group.
Thus, partisan antipathy reaches the ﬁrst level of Allport’s
prejudice framework, but it does so in an asymmetric way.

LEVEL 2 (AVOIDANCE): INTENTIONAL AVOIDANCE
AND ISOLATION OF OPPOSING PARTISANS
In many apolitical situations, people avoid those who do
not share their partisanship. Partisans sort themselves into

6. An additional sample of 418 drawn from SSI completed this task,
but they were randomly assigned the Republican-bashing story, the
Democrat-bashing story, or a control article on shark attacks. Results from
the two partisan conditions replicate results reported in the manuscript.
The endorsement rate for the shark attack article is nearly 8% higher than
for the partisan stories. Unlike the partisan articles, support for the control
article is consistently high for both Democrats and Republicans.
7. We include the regression models with and without controls for all
results in the appendix.
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Figure 1. Support for sharing the article

romantic relationships with others who share their partisan
identity. Indeed, partisan spousal preferences are actually
stronger than physical (e.g., body shape) or personality attributes (Alford et al. 2011). Partisan information is often
strategically suppressed on online dating sites (Klofstad et al.
2012), but when it is present, shared partisanship predicts
reciprocal communication between men and women seeking potential dates (Huber and Malhotra 2012). Partisans
are increasingly uncomfortable with their offspring marrying a member of the opposing party (Iyengar et al. 2012),
and actual marriage between opposing partisans is an
infrequent occurrence (Stoker and Jennings 1995). This increase in social distance may be related to the actual geographical distance that has grown between partisans (Bishop
2009; Tam Cho, Gimpel, and Hui 2013). Partisans appear
to prefer to date, marry, and live with co-partisans, but it is
unclear if this is because partisans desire to be with similar
individuals, if they dislike being with dissimilar individuals,
or a combination of both.
Past research also does not directly test the second level
of Allport’s framework. To meet the threshold set by Allport, it is not sufﬁcient for partisans to prefer co-partisans
or even to avoid opposing partisans. This avoidance must
be intentional, clearly visible to the avoided group, and the
avoidance must cause feelings of isolation among those
avoided. When making a selection on dating websites, picking a house, or selecting a mate, it is usually not clear that
a person or neighborhood was avoided or that this avoidance had anything to do with partisanship. We use a pair of
novel experiments to show that, when forming groups, partisans will avoid opposing partisans, that partisanship is

identiﬁed as the primary reason for exclusion, and that
those excluded are both aware that they were excluded because of their partisan afﬁliation and feel isolated as a result.

Study 2.1: Partisan prejudice in group selection
We test avoidance using a team formation task. As part of
the task, participants choose between ostensibly real participants that varied on a variety of attributes. This experiment allows us to determine whether sharing a party identity is more important than having a skilled teammate and,
as a result, the impact that affective polarization has on
this relationship.
Participants drawn from the SSI panel (N p 611) were
told that they would complete a series of puzzles (simpliﬁed
word completion tasks based on crossword puzzle clues) in
teams.8 The tasks and all clues had nothing to do with
politics. Participants were asked to complete three trial
rounds of the word completion task in order to increase the
validity of the design, to increase comprehension of what
the group would do, and to demonstrate the importance of
intelligence and education in the tasks. To enhance the
believability of the task, each participant was placed in a
“waiting room” and told that it would take a moment for a
sufﬁciently large group of other people completing the
survey to gather.
After a short amount of time, participants were told that
they were randomly selected by our software to continue as
8. See “Supporting Information” in the appendix for the stimuli and
the exact instructions.
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one of two team leaders. The other leader, they were told,
had already picked her team, and the respondent would
need to select three players from a list of four for the second
team. To incentivize the task, participants were told that
their success/score would hinge on both their abilities and
the abilities of their team. Participants were explicitly told
that the person not picked as a team member would be
excluded from participating in the remainder of the study.
The player proﬁles were constructed so that the least academically qualiﬁed player was an Independent.9 Two partisans (one Democrat and one Republican) were essentially
the same, both listed with college educations. An additional
Independent had qualiﬁcations that were lower than those
of the partisans but higher than the high school–educated
Independent (see table 2). Participants could therefore select the three players with the highest level of education
(tolerating a member of the political out-party) or make a
selection that excluded the political out-party in favor of
the less academically qualiﬁed Independents.10 The order
of each player was randomized, participants only completed one round of team selection, and all other traits
were ﬁxed.11
Partisanship had strong effects on team selection (see
ﬁg. 2). Roughly 54% of players excluded the opposing partisan player and opted for the less educated Independent,
9. To ensure that those participating in this task viewed education and
intelligence as highly relevant and political afﬁliation as irrelevant to task
performance, we recruited an additional sample of 418 from SSI. We asked
these individuals to read the task instructions, complete the example
questions, and read the group-formation instructions. However, instead of
showing the participants’ proﬁles, we asked individuals to rank a series of
seven traits (randomly ordered: age, education, gender, race, income,
political afﬁliation, and intelligence) by order of importance to successfully completing the task as a team member. Participants placed education
as ﬁrst- or second-most important 68% of the time. Similarly, participants
placed intelligence as ﬁrst or second 79% of the time. Political afﬁliation is
in the top two spots only 6.6% of the time and was identiﬁed as the least
important trait 24% of the time. The majority of those exposed to the task
viewed political afﬁliation as unimportant to task performance.
10. This task asks participants to exclude individuals from a team and
consequently excludes those individuals from possible payouts. In the
Allport framework, the primary consideration is the motivation for exclusion. In this study (and detailed in study 2.2), participants excluded
people out of self-interest (to form better teams) and not a desire to avoid
contact. This exclusion does create incidental harm, but participants did
not identify a desire to hurt the a supporter of the political opposition as
the reason for exclusion.
11. We choose to exclude race from the proﬁles for several reasons.
First, although race is a very important factor in group selection tasks,
prior work shows that the effects of partisanship trump the effects of race
in behavioral tasks (see Iyengar and Westwood 2015). Second, crossing
race with partisanship would generate many pairings that are rare in the
general public, which would reduce the validity and believability of this
design.
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while 94% of players selected the co-partisan to join their
team. Partisans clearly avoided the other side, even at the cost
of having a less educated team member working on tasks
that require education and verbal acumen. The effects of
affective polarization are even more dramatic. While affective polarization is related to both favoritism and avoidance,
the relationship is again asymmetric. As seen in the left panel
of ﬁgure 2, as levels of affective polarization increased, the
predicted probability of selecting the co-partisan to join a
team grew 12 points, from .86 among the least affectively
polarized to .98 among the most affectively polarized (b p
1.89, 95% conﬁdence interval [.12, 3.65]). Compare this to
the relationship between affective polarization and avoiding
the other side (b p 22.77, 95% conﬁdence interval [23.66,
21.87]). The predicted probability of selecting a teammate
from the opposing party among the least affectively polarized
is .89, and it drops to .34 among the most affectively polarized. To put this another way, the relationship between affective polarization and out-group avoidance is more than
six times as large as the relationship between affective polarization and in-group attraction. Of course, the probability
of selecting an in-group member is quite high even among
the least polarized, so the asymmetry is, at least, in part due
to ceiling effects.12
Participants did not hide their prejudices, and many
openly explained that they constructed their teams so as to
avoid members of the political opposition. After team selection, participants were shown the proﬁle of the person
they did not pick. Participants, in an open response ﬁeld,
were asked to explain their reasons (if any) for excluding
the person. In these responses 27.80% explicitly stated the
decision was because of the player’s partisanship, with 0%
of those in the bottom quartile of affective polarization and
47.37% of those in the top quartile of affective polarization
listing partisanship. By comparison, 21.79% listed education as the reason for exclusion.13
Participants citing partisanship as a reason for exclusion
were also less moved to try to include the excluded player
than those who listed some other reason for team selection.
After explaining their selection, participants were told, “In
earlier versions of this study many people who were not
picked to participate in a group reported feeling left out and
excluded. Knowing this, would you change your group se12. Party identiﬁcation does not moderate this relationship. The relationship between affective polarization and the probability of selecting a
co-partisan and the relationship between affective polarization and the
probability of not selecting an opposing partisan were the same for both
Republicans and Democrats (see Appendix 3.4 in the appendix).
13. Partisan-based motivations and education-based motivations were
coded using pattern matching. A human veriﬁed the classiﬁcations.
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Table 2. Study 2.1 Stimuli

Education
Gender
Age
Marital status
Political afﬁliation

Player 1

Player 2

Player 3

Player 4

Some college
Female
30
Married
Independent

High school
Male
32
Single
Independent

College degree
Female
35
Married
Republican

College degree
Female
31
Married
Democrat

lection or keep it the same?” Participants who reported that
their decision was based on partisanship were approximately
three times less likely to want to change their group than
those who made their decision for other reasons (3.70% vs.
10.52%). High levels of affective polarization are related to
decreased selection rates for members of the political opposition, and participants freely admitted to engaging in
prejudicial behavior. Moreover, those who selected based on
partisanship were more conﬁdent in their choices. Hence,
partisan avoidance is in no way unconscious or incidental
among the affectively polarized.

Study 2.2: Perceived partisan bias among
the excluded
Study 2.1 demonstrates that participants are more than
willing to avoid opposing partisans, but to fully test avoidance in Allport’s framework, we must show that those who
are excluded are aware that their exclusion is due to their
partisanship and not due to some other cause. To test this
component of avoidance, we constructed a second study to

assess how likely people who are ostensibly not picked to
play as part of a team attribute their exclusion to their
partisanship. A separate sample of 153 participants was
drawn from the SSI panel for this study. After completing
the three example word completion tasks, these participants
were told: “Two group leaders were randomly selected by
our software. Both leaders reviewed basic (anonymous) demographic information about you. You were not picked and
are therefore excluded from further participation.” The
participants were then told, “The leaders saw your age, level
of education, political party and martial status” and were
asked “Do you think any of these caused you to not be
picked (select as many as you think apply)?”
Indeed, the most commonly selected trait is partisanship, with 43.3% of participants attributing their exclusion
to their party afﬁliation (table 3). It is key to note that at
this point in the study neither partisanship nor politics
were mentioned or referenced (other than in three demographic questions within a set of 15). The percent of individuals reporting their partisanship as a reason for exclu-

Figure 2. Likelihood of selecting a co-partisan and opposing partisan team member
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Table 3. Respondent-Identiﬁed Trait(s) Responsible for Exclusion

Reason
Age
Level of education
Political party
Martial status

Overall (%)

Q1 of Affective
Polarization (%)

Q4 of Affective
Polarization (%)

33.1
22.3
43.3
8.3

45.7
28.6
42.9
11.4

30.3
18.2
48.5
3.0

sion is relatively stable across levels of affective polarization
and is similar for those at the lowest level of affective polarization (42.9%) and those at the highest level of affective
polarization (48.5%). Although many people identiﬁed that
partisanship had an effect on their exclusion, those at the
lowest levels of polarization were also likely to attribute
their exclusion to age and, to a lesser extent, their level of
education and martial status. For those at the highest level
of affective polarization, these other factors were much less
likely to be selected. The highly affectively polarized were
no more likely to identify partisanship as a reason for exclusion, but they were much more likely to only identify
partisanship as the reason for exclusion.
In sum, partisan prejudice is clearly related to avoiding
the other side. Partisans would rather work with members
of their own party than members of the other party. However, the more affectively polarized would rather work with a
less qualiﬁed Independent than a more qualiﬁed out-party
member. Additionally, both the avoiders and the avoided
identiﬁed partisanship as the primary reason for exclusion.
Surprisingly, the affectively polarized made no apologies
about their choice.

LEVEL 3 (DISCRIMINATION): DISCRIMINATORY
BEHAVIOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS
Partisan biases are strongly related to supporting hostile rhetoric about the opposition and avoiding opposing partisans,
the ﬁrst two levels of Allport’s framework. We now move
on to evaluate the third level of prejudice: discrimination.
Discrimination can manifest in many ways, from allocating
different punishments for different groups, or, conversely,
withholding rights or beneﬁts from groups. Importantly, this
level requires intentional actions designed to harm the opposing group. While study 1, study 2.1, and study 2.2 show evidence of behavior that might incidentally inﬂict harm, this is
not the primary motivation (as we show in study 2.2). To explore the relationship between partisan affective polarization
and the willingness of participants to make decisions that discriminate against the political opposition, we conduct two ex-

Signiﬁcance
(Q1 2 Q4)
p
p
p
p

p
p
p
p

.47
.82
.39
.70

periments in differing contexts. We construct our experiments
to detect discriminatory preferences in situations where discrimination would violate core democratic norms. Regardless
of the situation, the outcome remains the same: affective polarization is related to preferentially treating co-partisans but
is not related to inﬂicting harm on the opposition.14 The least
affectively polarized partisans generally treat the opposition
no differently than the most affectively polarized. However,
affective polarization is strongly related to helping or rewarding co-partisans.

Study 3.1: Tolerance for the suppression
of political action
The right to protest is a fundamental part of American politics and is a key mechanism used to combat racial, ethnic,
and gender discrimination (e.g., Etzioni 1970; Lipsky 1968;
Shingles 1981). While protests can advance the interests of
oppressed minorities, they can also galvanize negative views
among those opposed to granting minority groups equality.
We begin by testing how partisan biases affect responses to
the suppression of political demonstrations—an example of
where discriminatory behavior would be particularly troubling for the health of American democracy.
Participants (N p 395) read a newspaper story titled
“Police Use Tear Gas on Peaceful Young [Democrat/Republican] Protest.”15 The story described a situation where
police ofﬁcers broke up a peaceful student protest. (See
table 4.) Participants were asked two target questions. First,
participants reported whether they “agree or disagree with
the decision to use tear gas on the protesters.” Next participants were told, “The cost of the police response is
unknown at this point, but the city can ﬁne the protests

14. Results from studies 2.1, 2.2, and 3.1 show bias in decision making
that many would classify as discrimination. Although not sufﬁcient to
reach the threshold of discrimination in the Allport framework of prejudice, the results, deﬁnitional debates aside, are an indication of strong
partisan bias in the American public.
15. The study was ﬁelded in 2013.
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Table 4. Study 3.1 Stimuli
Headline: Police Use Tear Gas on Peaceful Young [Republican/Democratic] Protest
Full text: Riot police broke up a group of Young [Republican/Democratic] protesting a tuition increase at a college north of
New York yesterday, using what appeared to be tear gas.
Students had been told earlier that “all necessary force” would be used to ensure the protests did not interfere with the administration,
in line with a recent court injunction requested and received by 53 of the school’s students.
Witnesses reported that 30 police ofﬁcers deployed to confront the 80 peaceful protesters. After some jostling and use of what appeared
to be tear gas by police, the crowd blocking the doors broke and moved away.
Alan Krenshaw, a spokesperson for the Young [Republican/Democratic], complained that “The brutality was absolutely designed to
chill the movement and literally try to beat and terrorize our right to criticize, to think critically and to act on that criticism.”

any amount up to $10,000. What amount, if any, do you think
the city should ﬁne the group of protesters?” Participants
answered using a slider widget.
Only a small minority of participants agreed with the
police action (i.e., gave responses above the midpoint), and
this proportion is not signiﬁcantly different when the protesters were in-party members or when the protesters were
out-party members (15% vs. 20%, respectively). Participants
tended to disagree with the police actions, with a small and
insigniﬁcant difference (b p 2.05, 95% conﬁdence interval
[2.12, 0.01]) in disagreement depending on whether participants were asked about the in-party or the out-party.16
The mean proposed ﬁne toward the protesters is signiﬁcantly lower in the in-party condition ($1,713.75) than in
the out-party condition ($3,000.21), a difference of $1,286.46
(95% conﬁdence interval [$553.72, $2,019.19]) or 57.12%.
The relationship between affective polarization and the
suggested punishment is asymmetric in favor of co-partisans.
The left panel of ﬁgure 3 shows that higher levels of affective polarization are strongly negatively related to agreeing
with the police action when the target was a member of the
in-party (b p 2.31, 95% conﬁdence interval [2.52, 2.10]).
The right panel shows that affective polarization is not
signiﬁcantly related to agreeing with the police action when
the target was a member of the out-party (b p .06, 95%
conﬁdence interval [2.17, .29]). The differences between
the slopes of affective polarization for both conditions is
substantively larger than zero (b p .37, 95% conﬁdence
interval [.20, .54]). Maximally polarized participants, compared to minimally polarized participants, were more likely
to oppose punishment of protesters from their party, but
they also were no more likely to support punishing protesters from the opposing party.

16. The distribution of the ﬁne is negatively skewed, but as results are
not substantively different, we present difference in means and use OLS
regressions instead of reporting the results of a quantile regression.

Similarly, more affectively polarized participants recommended a lower ﬁne when evaluating co-partisan protesters
than less affectively polarized participants (b p 26.06, 95%
conﬁdence interval [28.82, 23.29]; ﬁg. 4, left panel).17 Affective
polarization is not, however, related to the size of the ﬁne when
the protesters were members of the out-party (b p .73, 95%
conﬁdence interval [22.33, 3.82]; ﬁg. 4, right panel).18
While there was an asymmetry in outcomes—participants
suggested less punishment when the protesters were copartisans than when they were opposing partisans—the
asymmetry was due to co-partisan favoritism, not a desire to
harm the opposition (i.e., discriminate) against opposing
partisans. We ﬁnd no evidence that affective polarization
predicts intent to discriminate against members of the opposition in this study.19

Study 3.2: Tolerance for political corruption
Scandals are fodder for both the media and political elites,
but they represent a substantial challenge to democratic
governance. Prior work shows that partisans respond differently to the scandalous or alleged criminal activities of
co-partisans and opposition partisans (e.g., Dancey 2014;
Peterson and Vonnahme 2014). Partisans, in general, are
less likely today to believe in the guilt of co-partisan
17. In ﬁg. 4, we report the natural log of the ﬁne amount. Both raw
scores and other transformations give similar results.
18. We do see differences between Republicans and Democrats in this
experiment (see appendix 4.6). However, because differences in response
by party ID do not replicate in the next study and because the total N is
small when the sample is split by party ID, we are not able to make strong
conclusions about these results.
19. We repeated this study with 481 participants drawn from SSI with
a treatment suppressing the identity of the group—the protesters were
identiﬁed as students opposed to a tuition increase (rather than Young
Democrats or Young Republicans). Nearly 33% of respondents strongly
agreed with police actions when the group was not afﬁliated with partisanship, which is 13% higher than level of support for police intervention
for co-partisans and 18% higher than the level of support for police intervention of opposing partisans.
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Figure 3. Support for punishing protesters

ofﬁcials. But do such responses demonstrate a desire to prop
up one’s own party or a desire to punitively attack the opposition? In this study, we replicate the results from study 3.1
but alter the domain to focus on a situation where actual
wrongdoing has occurred. We use a scenario where a political
elite has violated fund-raising laws to advance his political
party. The structure of a newspaper article with randomly
varied partisan actors is retained. (See table 5.)
Participants (N p 475) recruited from the SSI panel
read a faux newspaper article titled “Donations from Millionaire Businessman to [Republican/Democratic] Super
PACs in Question.” The article reported that investigators

were looking into possibly illegal donations that may have
swayed an election. Participants indicated if they supported
the investigation of the businessman on a seven-point bipolar scale ranging from “strongly oppose” to “strongly
support,” which was recoded to range between 0 and 1.
Regardless of whether the target was a member of the
out-party or the in-party, participants adopted the normatively “correct” position and favored an investigation of
possibly illegal activities (see ﬁg. 4). However, participants
more fervently supported an investigation of an out-party
member (M p .74) than an investigation of an in-party
member (M p. 61, 95% conﬁdence interval of the difference

Figure 4. Logged amount of the suggested protester ﬁne
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Table 5. Study 3.2 Stimuli
Headline: Donations from Millionaire Businessman to [Republican/Democratic] Super PACs in Question
Full text: Federal election ofﬁcials announced this morning that 6 million dollars in donations from Alan Gregory, a retired millionaire,
to [Republican/Democratic] Super PACs are now under investigation.
Ofﬁcials allege that the donations were made through a questionable middle-man over a period of two months. The case is particularly
important, as support from Mr. Gregory is credited in the victory of several [Republican/Democratic] state ofﬁcials in the last election.
Mr. Gregory and [Republican/Democratic] party ofﬁcials deny the allegations and claim that although the donations were not transparent,
they were not illegal.

[2.18, 2.08]). While there is in-party favoritism, it does not
overcome the desire to investigate the wrong-doing of the
middle man, with the mean always above the midpoint on
the disagree-agree scaler in the in-party condition ($1,713.75)
than in the out-party condition ($3,000.21), a difference of
$1,286.46 (95% conﬁdence interval [$553.72, $2,019.19]) or
57.12%.
High levels of affective polarization do move participants enough to be on the fence on the investigation of a
co-partisan (b p 2.40, 95% conﬁdence interval [2.60,
2.21]; ﬁg. 5, left panel). The probability of those at the
highest levels of affective polarization supporting an investigation of a co-partisan is .49, while the probability
for those at the lowest levels of affective polarization supporting the investigation is .89. Affective polarization is not
at all related to supporting an investigation when the target
is a member of the out-party (b p .05, 95% conﬁdence
interval [2.18, .28]; ﬁg. 5, right panel).20
These results replicate study 3.1. While there is an asymmetry in attitudes toward the target of the investigation, this
asymmetry is the result of co-partisan favoritism, not antagonism toward opposing partisans. Affective polarization
is a reason to support co-partisans and not a source of intentional harm against opposing partisans.21
Despite different contexts, these experiments show remarkably consistent results. Partisanship matters, but the
relationship between partisan affect and decision making
shows that partisans are more likely to help fellow partisans than they are to hurt those in the opposition. When
placed in zero-sum decision tasks in other studies (picking

20. This relationship does not differ between Republican and Democrats
(see appendix 5.3)
21. We repeated this study with a sample of 429 drawn from SSI with
a treatment suppressing the partisanship of the individual accused of violating campaign ﬁnance laws. Nearly 67% of respondents supported the
investigation of campaign irregularities when partisanship was not identiﬁed. This is higher than the rate for co-partisans and lower than the rate
for opposing partisans, which is again consistent with differing co-partisan
and opposing partisan effects.

a scholarship winner, a date, a spouse, etc.) partisans—especially those with higher levels of affective polarization—are
more likely to select a co-partisan, but our results suggest that
this is because of in-group favoritism and not out-group
hatred.

DISCUSSION
We show that affective polarization, underpinned by the inherently competitive nature of partisanship, relates to some
kinds of prejudicial behavior. However, affective polarization,
like other in-group–out-group divides documented in psychology, is more about in-group love than out-group hate.
While in line with years of psychology research, this is a surprising ﬁnding, as it is counter to recent work in political
science on the nature of partisan bias. There is no doubt that
partisan affective polarization is at historically high levels in
America (Iyengar et al. 2012) and that hostility dominates
politics (see Grimmer and King 2011; Sobieraj and Berry
2011). But the reality of partisan prejudice, we ﬁnd, is likely
more nuanced than most popular accounts. Partisan bias is
signiﬁcant, but partisan prejudice more consistently relates to
behavior that beneﬁts co-partisans than behavior that hurts
opposing partisans. Partisans willingly engage in some behaviors that might incidentally cause harm to the opposition
(negative speech and avoidance), but they are not willing to
impose harm (even when responding to a survey question
where we would expect partisan bias to appear unfettered).
Throughout this paper, we use Allport’s framework to contextualize the effects of affective polarization on prejudicial
behavior. But even for readers who are less convinced of the
utility of Allport, our experiments demonstrate that partisan
affect is related to behavior that beneﬁts co-partisans but that is
less conclusively related to a desire to directly harm (discriminate against) opposing partisans. Although the affectively
polarized are more likely to deride and avoid the opposition,
this behavior does not translate into bias against the opposition
in situations where democratic rights are at stake.
While we do not ﬁnd consistent evidence of out-group
punishment, we do consistently ﬁnd evidence of in-group
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Figure 5. Support for a corruption investigation

favoritism. The fact that we see such an asymmetry indicates
that the emotions do not run as high as often portrayed.
The two studies we used to test level 3 in Allport’s framework (discrimination) use a simple vignette design that, unlike work with trust games (Carlin and Love 2013; Iyengar
and Westwood 2015) and work with actual cash payouts
(Levendusky et al. 2015), include no incentive to temper
partisan animosity. With no ﬁnancial incentive to constrain
partisan animus and no social norms to temper partisan
hostility through social desirability bias, we should expect
overwhelming evidence of partisan hate. The set of experiments presented here show that the effect of partisan animosity on behavior is perhaps less intense than prior work
anticipates. This is consistent with decades of social psychological research that ﬁnd a similar asymmetry in a variety
of domains (e.g., Brewer 1999; Otten et al. 1996; Otten and
Wentura 1999; Perdue et al. 1990). That is not to say that
out-group punishment or derogation is not possible. Hostility (rather than favoritism) manifests when stronger emotions (e.g., fear) are attached to the out-group (Mackie,
Devos, and Smith 2000). For instance, “an out-group that
violates in-group norms may elicit disgust and avoidance; an
out-group seen as beneﬁting unjustly (e.g., from government
programs) may elicit resentment and actions aimed at reducing beneﬁts; and an out-group seen as threatening may
elicit fear and hostile actions” (Hewstone, Rubin, and Willis
2002, 580).
There is a link between affective polarization and promoting negative speech against the opposition, but the relationship is much stronger between negative attitudes and

quashing negative speech against one’s own group than
promoting hate speech against the opposition. We also ﬁnd
that affective polarization is related to seeking the company
of co-partisans but that it is more strongly related to
avoiding the out-party.22 In the Allport typology, these two
forms of prejudice are signiﬁcant but substantially less
concerning than outright discrimination against opposing
partisans, which causes material harm. That typology aside,
the difference between more innocuous forms of prejudice—
tolerance for negative speech about the opposition and avoidance of the opposition—is clearly distinct from discrimination
as it is commonly understood and observed in other social
divides such as race and gender. Partisan-based avoidance may
create harm, which is troubling, but we show that avoidance
and isolation are not an indication of more onerous discriminatory behavior.23
Finally, we do not ﬁnd consistent differences between
the behavior of Democrats and Republicans, despite theoretical expectations to the contrary. Republicans were more
likely to quash critical articles than Democrats, but they
were not more likely to avoid the out-party. Additionally,
22. This ﬁnding supports Huber and Malhotra (2012), which documents
signiﬁcant levels of partisan-based avoidance on online dating sites. We extend that work by showing that most partisans prefer the company of
members of their own party but that only the affectively polarized avoid the
out-party. Avoidance is one mechanism that may increase affective polarization and ultimately yield out-group derogation, as homogeneous networks
tend to yield lower levels of tolerance (Mutz 2002).
23. For a review of the concepts of discriminatory intent versus disparate harm, see Primus (2003).
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Republicans and Democrats appear to behave differently in
the free speech experiment, but both groups behaved similarly in the corruption experiment. While some literature
does indicate that Republicans should engage in higher
levels of intergroup bias than Democrats, our results seem
to indicate that these differences are not robust.
There are limitations to this work that should be considered. First, while our studies have high internal validity,
concerns related to external and ecological validity must be
addressed. The stimuli were contrived, and the participants
were asked to make judgments about events they had just
read about in a survey. Relatedly, our last set of studies do
not use behavioral measures. On the one hand, the task was
no less behavioral than those that asked respondents to
make scholarship allocation decisions (Iyengar and Westwood 2015; Munro, Weih, and Tsai 2010) or studies that
ask respondents to choose one candidate over another (e.g.,
Tomz and Van Houweling 2008, 2009). On the other, we
readily acknowledge the advantages of behavioral measures.
We are comforted somewhat in the fact that the marginal
effect of partisanship mirrors studies that use various economic games, such as those used in Carlin and Love (2013)
or Iyengar and Westwood (2015).
Second, we look at how the affectively polarized respond
to our treatments—an approach fully consistent with other
work in political science that assesses the role of prejudice by
assessing the interaction between attitudes and experimental
conditions (see, e.g., Feldman and Huddy 2005; Mo 2014;
Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004; Stenner 2005).
Nonetheless, to truly identify the causal effects of prejudice,
we would need to be able to randomly assign differing levels
of affective polarization to respondents. This may be possible
in the “minimal group” paradigm, but it is more difﬁcult
when identities are already formed.
Third, had real events similar to those described in the faux
newspaper articles occurred, there would likely have been
high-levels of media attention that could exacerbate possible
partisan discrimination. There may be other factors that
moderate the effects we observe. Future research should explore the role of respondent’s media diets, level of political
interest, and past political engagement on partisan discrimination. Nonetheless, our results were assessed with a large
number of participants, with realistic stimuli, and with nationally representative samples. There are counterexamples to
the studies presented here, and many other manipulations that
could and should be tested. Our work, nonetheless, produces
results that are strikingly consistent, and when taken together,
they present a clear pattern of behavior.
Finally, all our results focus on the American political
system. The two-party structure of American politics and the

growth of the permanent campaign creates a unique ingroup and out-group dynamic that possibly magniﬁes partisan animus. Unlike other political systems with a multitude
of parties aligned across the ideological spectrum that often
form coalition governments, the United States is far more
stable, which can lead to a stronger sense of group identity.
However, recent work shows that in-group partisan identity
is both common and relatively stable across various types of
democratic systems with varying numbers of political parties
(see Carlin and Love 2013, 2016; Westwood et al. 2015).
Our results have important implications for the the
modern American political arena. Political rancor permeates
the political landscape, but while the rhetoric can be apocalyptic, most Americans, while willing to tolerate and support co-partisan preferential treatment, are not willing to
punish or harm based on partisanship. Even the most affectively polarized—those with the strongest hatred for the
opposition—are no more likely to intentionally inﬂict harm
on the opposition than those with minimal affective political
preferences. Wide tolerance for negativity is one explanation
for why so many politicians and candidates are willing to
engage in political attacks and utilize negative campaigning.
But our results also show that there is a possible disconnect
between elite behavior and citizen preferences. Citizens seem
to approve of the negativity and bluster of representative
rhetoric (Grimmer and King 2011), especially in uncompetitive districts. But citizens may not want their representatives to take it further, especially when their actions may
violate the rights of members of the out-party.
Partisan redistricting represents one such disconnect.
Ruling parties routinely gerrymander districts in a way that
potentially violates the principle of one person, one vote
(Raviv 2005). However, among citizens who are aware of
redistricting (roughly half of citizens are not), large majorities believe it is unfair and would prefer that redistricting
be left up to the courts or independent commissions (Fougere, Ansolabehere, and Persily 2010). It seems, then, that
citizens would prefer that their representatives not discriminate against members of the out-party in the electoral
arena. Similarly, support for voter identiﬁcation laws drops
when respondents are told that it keeps eligible citizens from
voting (Wilson and Brewer 2013). Hostility is growing in the
electorate, but for now it is largely avoidance, a tolerance for
hostile speech, and support for preferential treatment of copartisans.
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